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Ex POST INCENTIVES AND IP IN GARCIA V.
GOOGLE AND BEYOND
Clark D. Asay*
INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit's recent opinion in Garcia v. Google, Inc.1 has attracted
significant attention across the legal, political, and business worlds because of
its possible implications for copyright law, free expression, and existing busi-
ness models in the entertainment industry.2 The plaintiff, Cindy Lee Garcia,
made several requests to Google's YouTube to take down an anti-Islamic film
hosted on that service that included a brief performance by her. Google denied
each such request. Garcia then sought a preliminary injunction against Google,
but she lost at the district court level.3
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court was wrong in its
denial of injunctive relief in part because Garcia likely had a copyright interest
in her performance in the film.4 The court reasoned that, although Garcia was
not a joint copyright owner of the film, she could still own an independent cop-
* Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School.
1. 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2014), amended by 2014 WL 3377343 (9th. Cir. July 11,
2014).
2. See, e.g., Eriq Gardner, Netflix Asks Appellate Court to Reconsider 'Innocence of
Muslims' Ruling, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 15, 2014, 11:25 AM PDT), http://
www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/netflix-asks-appellate-court-reconsider-696226 (argu-
ing that if the result is not overturned, Netflix's business model faces serious difficulties that
may well undermine it); Corynne McSherry, Bad Facts, Really Bad Law: Court Orders
Google to Censor Controversial Video Based on Spurious Copyright Claim, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/bad-facts-really
-bad-law-court-orders-google-censor-controversial-video-based (suggesting that the outcome
of the case represented a weak copyright claim trumping important free speech considera-
tions, particularly in light of an important political discussion surrounding the film);
Schuyler M. Moore, Garcia v. Google: Hard Cases Make Bad Law, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG
(Mar. 5, 2014, 2:40 PM EST), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/schuyler-m-moore/garcia-v
-google-hard-case b_4900376.html (arguing that the Garcia decision misconstrued copy-
right law in order to reach the political result that the court wanted).
3. For background and some analysis of the case, see Stefan M. Mentzer & Priya
Srinivasan, The Garcia v. Google Controversy and What It Means for Content Owners and
Users, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3b6ff 140
-49al-4a85-9f90-b27d5987937a.
4. Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1262-65.
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yright in her performance within it.5 While the court later amended its opinion,
its basic holdings remained the same. 6
Some argue that the court erred in so ruling because Garcia's performance
does not actually satisfy the Copyright Act's requirements; others suggest the
court's analysis is wrong because it fails to properly take into account im-
portant legislative and constitutional protections of free expression; and yet
others contend the result is mistaken because of its likely practical effects on
certain business models.7
In contrast, this Essay articulates a theory for why we should be uneasy
with the outcome in Garcia. I argue that Garcia is bad law because it is the
epitome of "ex post incentives" leading to "ex post IP." I define "ex post incen-
tives" as incentives to claim intellectual property (IP) rights that are incidental
to the creation of the work; often they arise in contexts such as Garcia where
parties seek to use IP law to protect interests beyond those that IP law was
meant to serve. I define "ex post IP" as IP rights whose scope is exceedingly
unclear even after creation of the work; the rights must be determined, if at all,
after the fact in a court of law.
I suggest that scenarios involving ex post incentives and ex post IP contra-
vene the theory and purpose underlying the constitutional provision that pro-
vides for copyright law. This theoretical framework, furthermore, is helpful in
identifying and assessing other thorny problems in IP law as well. In particular,
I argue that this framework provides us a better theoretical understanding for
why we should disfavor patent trolls, or patent owners that do not make prod-
ucts but sue others that do.
I. GARCIA'S PREDICAMENT
The plaintiff in Garcia, Cindy Lee Garcia, found herself mired in a poten-
tially dangerous controversy. She agreed to perform a script provided to her as
part of a low-budget amateur film titled Desert Warrior. For her three and a
half days of filming, she was paid $500. Subsequently, the scene was altered
and used in Innocence of Muslims, an anti-Islamic film. Once the film became
available on YouTube, outrage in the Islamic world and elsewhere ensued. Pro-
tests erupted around the globe, with some suggesting that the attack on the U.S.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Corynne McSherry, Ninth Circuit Doubles Down in Garcia v. Google,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 11, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/ninth
-circuit-doubles-down-in-garcia-v-google (indicating that while the amended decision rec-
ognizes some of the concerns raised by amici, it keeps intact the original decision's key find-
ings). The most substantial addition that the amended decision made was to suggest that the
district court on remand was free to disagree with the court's analysis, which may be diffi-
cult to square with the court's finding that individual performances are copyrightable as a
matter of law. Accord Rebecca Tushnet, Amended Aggravation: Garcia v. Google, REBECCA
TUSHNET's 43(B)LOG (July 14, 2014, 8:02 AM), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/07
/amended-aggravation-garcia-v-google.html.
7. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
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embassy in Benghazi, Libya, was in response to the film.8 Garcia eventually
even received death threats. 9
Understandably, Garcia wanted to stop access to the film. What were her
options? She could sue the film's producer for breach of contract or some form
of fraud. But each of these suits would take time to resolve, and meanwhile the
film would remain accessible.
Instead, Garcia requested that Google remove the film from YouTube be-
cause it, she claimed, violated her copyright interest in her performance in the
film. Garcia made such requests pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA), which generally shields online service providers from copyright
liability so long as they meet certain requirements, one of which is to respond
expeditiously to takedown notices from authors claiming that infringing mate-
rial is located on their service.10 But, as noted, Google declined each of her re-
quests. Her request for a preliminary injunction at the district court level simi-
larly fell on deaf ears.
II. COPYRIGHT' S PREDICAMENT
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, remanded the case, ruling that Garcia had
likely met her burden of demonstrating a copyright interest in her performance
in the film. The court reasoned that her performance was "fixed" as required by
the Copyright Act and appeared to include some amount of creativity-another
requirement of the Copyright Act-despite being based on a script provided to
her. 11 That creativity may include her "body language, facial expression and
reactions to other actors and elements of a scene." 12
Rebuttals of the court's reasoning have been numerous. Some argue that
the court misconstrued copyright law in a way that will lead to disastrous con-
sequences. For instance, if each contributor to a larger work such as a film is
deemed to possess a copyright interest in her contribution, each such contribu-
tor is then able to prevent access to the larger work (i.e., precisely the result in
Garcia).13 Applying copyright law in this manner can thus lead to problems
with holdup and censorship while also making the work generally unusable due
to the fragmented nature of ownership.14
8. Scott Shane, Clearing the Record About Benghazi, N.Y. Tnyms (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/us/politics/questions-and-answers-on-the-benghazi
-attack.html (highlighting that Susan Rice, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, sug-
gested that the film helped cause the attacks).
9. Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1262.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 1263-64.
12. Id. at 1263.
13. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Intellectual Prop. Law in Support of
Google, Inc. & YouTube, LLC's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3, Garcia, 743 F.3d 1258
(No. 12-57302).
14. Id.
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To help address these and other issues, Congress created the concept of
"joint work[s]," where larger works are created "by two or more authors with
the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdepend-
ent parts of a unitary whole." According to the majority view, the joint au-
thors of the resulting work are only those who at the outset are intended to be
coauthors of the overall larger work; these authors possess copyright interests
in the work.16 Other contributors to the work, conversely, do not.
Concerns with fragmented ownership form the basis of several amici briefs
submitted to the court as well. For instance, Netflix and several prominent news
organizations and broadcasters submitted briefs to the court arguing that their
business models were in danger should such a decision be upheld.17
Others argue that the court failed to properly take into account the likely
ramifications for free expression. For instance, some argue that the decision
failed to address important safe harbors found in section 230 of the Communi-
cations Decency Act. Section 230 provides robust immunity to online service
providers for many types of third-party content hosted on their sites and consti-
tutes, according to some, the "legal foundation for many of the most popular
websites" in the world. 19 While section 230 does provide an exception for in-
tellectual property claims, commentators argue that parties such as Garcia in-
creasingly exploit that exception in order to remove content that they simply do
not like. 20
Relatedly, others suggest that the court improperly applied the standards
for granting injunctive relief by discounting vital First Amendment considera-
tions and the public's interest in accessing the film as part of a larger political
debate. And it did so solely on the basis of a dubious copyright claim. 2 1
III. THE IP CLAUSE AND GARCIA'S THEORETICAL PROBLEMS
Each of these arguments certainly has merit. But even more fundamentally,
the decision contravenes the purpose of and theory behind copyright. Article I,
15. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also id. §§ 106A(b), 201(a); Brief of Amici Curiae
Professors of Intellectual Prop. Law in Support of Google, Inc. & YouTube, LLC's Petition
for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 13, at 3. Of course, another purpose of the concept of
joint works may be to facilitate their creation by awarding each contributing author of the
larger work a copyright interest in the whole.
16. Michael B. Landau, Joint Works Under United States Copyright Law: Judicial
Legislation Through Statutory Misinterpretation, 54 IDEA 157, 166-71 (2014).
17. See Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Defendants-Appellees Google Inc. &
YouTube, LLC by Cal. Broadcasters Ass'n, Garcia, 743 F.3d 1258 (No. 12-57302); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Netflix, Inc., Garcia, 743 F.3d 1258 (No. 12-57302).
18. See Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Law Professors in Support of Google, Inc. &
YouTube, LLC' s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 4, Garcia, 743 F.3d 1258 (No. 12-
57302).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 7-15.
21. See McSherry, supra note 2.
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Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to grant au-
thors "the exclusive Right to their respective Writings" in order to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts." The most ubiquitous understanding of
this clause, often referred to as the "utilitarian" or "economic incentives" theory
of intellectual property law, argues that without providing these incentives ex
ante, society would suffer because prospective authors would be unwilling to
create the works for fear that others would simply copy them, thereby under-
mining any potential market for the works.22
The Constitution's IP Clause also appears to contemplate granting rights in
discernable "Writings" and other creative works. This seems to be one im-
portant implication of the reference to "respective Writings," because if the
boundaries of a work are not discernable, it becomes difficult if not impossible
to distinguish between the respective creative works of one author over another.
Blurry rights would also reduce ex ante incentives to create, since creators
would not be able to prospectively assess the risks inherent in their creative ac-
tivity.
The Constitution's IP Clause and the utilitarian theory behind it, then, ap-
pear to justify granting intellectual property rights in cases where "ex ante in-
centives" are necessary for the author to create the work in the first place. They
also appear to favor these incentives, leading to the creation of what I call "ex
ante IP," or rights of authors whose boundaries are fairly certain even before
authors have created the works or such rights have been litigated before a court.
IV. GARCIA'S PREDICAMENT REVISITED
In Garcia, rather than ex ante incentives leading to ex ante IP, ex post in-
centives resulted in ex post IP. For instance, Garcia appears to have latched on
to copyright as a means of removing the film once other options were deemed
less than ideal. Indeed, in her initial complaint she failed to even assert a copy-
right claim, instead relying on claims of defamation, misrepresentation, and
fraud.2 3
Hence, she had ex post incentives to claim copyright in order to limit ac-
cess to the film. But copyright does not appear to have functioned as an ex ante
incentive necessary for her to create the work; the incentive for her perfor-
mance was three days' worth of pay. For Garcia, copyright was a move of last
resort rather than an ex ante lure.
And what, exactly, are the contours of Garcia's rights in her performance?
The performance was based on a script provided to her; she simply performed
in accordance with it. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that her copyright inter-
22. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REv. 709, 736-38
(2012).
23. Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. BC492358 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2012),
available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1688&context
=historical.
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est in the perfonnance was thus derivative of the underlying copyrighted script
and further suggested that the scope of her rights was somewhat murky. 24
In other words, the court ruled that Garcia likely has some rights in the per-
formance, even if it would be hard pressed to say what those rights are. Her al-
leged rights exemplify ex post IP, or IP rights that are exceedingly unclear until
after a court has declared what they are. And they may remain unclear even af-
ter a court's determination, as in Garcia.
In contrast, the rights attendant to ex ante IP are known with a good
amount of certainty even before creation of the work and absent any court opin-
ion. To illustrate: when an author writes a book, the author has certain rights
that in some respects are well defined. The author knows that in nearly all cas-
es, no one can without her authorization copy the book in its entirety. Further-
more, if someone wants to translate the book into another language or make a
movie out of it, the author knows that in nearly all cases she will need to au-
thorize that activity as well.
However, some potential rights in the book are less certain. For instance,
can someone copy a large portion of the book in order to criticize it and society
in general without the author's consent? What about simply using some pas-
sages from the book, or perhaps following its general structure without copying
the exact contents? The answers to these questions are uncertain at best, even
upon creation of the book, and in order to be answered definitively, the ques-
tions would need to be litigated. These types of ex post IP rights are similar to
the rights that the Ninth Circuit determined Garcia likely has in her perfor-
mance: unclear without litigation, and perhaps still unclear even after a court
ruling.
V. THE IP CLAUSE AND IP THEORY REVISITED
Clearly not all uncertainty associated with IP rights can be eliminated;
courts will remain necessary to interpret and apply the law. Some even suggest
that in certain cases uncertainty in IP law plays a positive role.25 But generally,
greater certainty leads to greater predictability, which typically should promote
greater innovation and creativity as parties are able to more accurately take into
account the risks of their activities. As a general theoretical, constitutional, and
practical matter, in most cases we should favor ex ante IP over ex post IP
rights.
The same conclusion holds true when comparing ex ante incentives to ex
post incentives. The constitutional basis for granting IP rights is to promote in-
24. Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1264-65.
25. See, e.g., Kristelia A. Garcia, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89
N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=2313943 (arguing generally that uncertainty can improve market efficiency in
cases where rights are unclear, because this lack of clarity functions as a penalty default that
encourages more efficient private ordering solutions).
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novative activities by holding forth ex ante the lure of exclusive rights. If that
lure is unnecessary and society receives the creative works without it, society is
overall better off.
When ex post incentives combine with ex post IP rights, the theoretical,
practical, and constitutional justifications for IP law are at their nadir. The Gar-
cia decision is a clear example of such a scenario. Garcia claimed copyright on-
ly in order to protect her bodily interests, not her expressive ones. And even
once she claimed copyright, it isn't clear, even according to the court, what in-
terests she is claiming. Ex post incentives combined with ex post IP rights in
Garcia to leave us all in doubt.
VI. A THEORETICAL STRIKE AGAINST PATENT TROLLS
The theoretical framework drawn from Garcia can be applied to other vex-
ing problems in IP law as well. For instance, one of the more contentious issues
in patent law today concerns patent trolls, or those patent owners that do not
practice their patents but sue others that do.
Commentators often react negatively to the activities of such entities, but
without offering a clear theoretical reason as to why we should disfavor them. I
suggest that, similar to Garcia, we should disfavor patent trolls because they
are in the patent world the epitome of ex post incentives leading to the creation
and/or claiming of ex post IP rights. Patent trolls, for instance, often acquire
their patents from corporations that have no real need for the patents and simp-
ly sell them off in order to monetize them.26 The patent trolls, therefore, have
ex post incentives to acquire the patent rights; by definition the patents are not
acting as ex ante incentives to their (lack of) innovative activity.
But even if patent trolls do not have ex ante incentives, the corporations
and other parties from which they acquire the patent rights may. For instance,
some almost certainly pursue innovative activity in pursuit of patent rights; the
ex ante possibility of patent rights-including the ability to sell them at a later
date-may inform their decision to pursue the innovative activity in the first
place. In this light, patent trolls may be an important piece of the innovation
puzzle rather than an overall detriment to it.27
While this line of reasoning may hold true in some cases, in many others it
seems dubious. Corporations often acquire patents not for ex ante incentive rea-
sons, but because it simply lacks business sense not to pursue patents for inno-
vations that the corporations are already pursuing. Indeed, in many cases they
may feel compelled to pursue patents simply because others do. But the result-
26. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2149 (2013) (indicating that patent trolls generally acquire their pa-
tents from third parties).
27. For a defense of the activities of patent trolls and patent rights generally, see Na-
than Myhrvold, Patents Are Very Valuable, Tech Giants Discover, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July
11, 2011, 8:40 PM EDT), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2011-07-20/patents-are
-very-valuable-tech-giants-discover-nathan-myhrvold.
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ing patent nuclear arms race should not necessarily be construed as evidence
that parties would not innovate but for the lure of patents; it may be better con-
strued as evidence that patent law's strict liability regime requires acquisition
of patents for defensive purposes.28 In other words, an incentive to acquire pa-
tents may exist, even if the patent itself is not acting as a necessary ex ante in-
centive to innovation. Other factors, such as competition, may be the true cata-
lyst to the innovative activity in many cases.29
The problems associated with ex post IP are also manifest in the activities
of patent trolls and patent law more generally. For instance, one pervasive
complaint with the patent system is that the boundaries of patents are often dif-
ficult to discern and that patent trolls exploit this feature to their advantage in
order to force parties to settle what are often otherwise weak legal claims. 30
That is, because the costs of paying off the patent trolls are less than litigating
the matter to determine precisely the boundaries of the patents, many of the ac-
cused simply settle. In such cases, ex post IP remains ex post IP. And society
suffers as a result.
In sum, the lessons of Garcia can be applied more broadly to IP law in
general. While at first blush Garcia and patent trolls may appear to have little
in common, the theoretical framework laid out in this Essay connects them in a
way that enables us to better assess the common problems in each.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's Garcia decision was wrong for a number of reasons.
This Essay has focused on identifying constitutional and theoretical reasons
why it was wrong and applying that framework to other controversial IP topics,
such as patent trolls. This theoretical framework suggests that denying ex post
IP rights where primarily ex post incentives are at play would improve the effi-
cacy of IP law in general. Others have suggested a variety of reforns to IP
law,3 1 and this Essay provides those and other reform proposals with theoreti-
28. For a discussion of a proposal on one way to relax patent law's strict liability re-
gime and the potential benefits of doing so, see generally Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patent-
less Innovation, 74 MD. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstractid=2289326.
29. For discussions of industries in which competition appears to be the catalyst for
innovation, see Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End ofEnd-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925, 960-62 (2001)
(Internet); Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property Rights: A Re-
ply to Kieff, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 707, 709-10 (2001) (biotechnology); and Howard A. Shelan-
ski, Competition and Deployment of New Technology in U.S. Telecommunications, 2000 U.
Cm. LEGAL F. 85, 85 (telecommunications).
30. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 26, at 2173 (discussing this phenomenon in
the IT industry in particular).
31. For some recent proposals that, if pursued, may help address some of the problems
of ex post incentives leading to ex post IP, see Asay, supra note 28 (discussing one way to
relax patent law's strict liability regime and thereby allow parties to partially opt out of the
patent system); Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U.
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cal guidance on the best way to implement them. Without such reforms and a
consistent theory behind them, IP law runs the risk of expanding and morphing
in ways that hinder rather than promote innovation and creativity. And in so do-
ing, IP law flouts the very reasons for which it was instituted.
COLO. L. REv. 53 (2014) (discussing how a certain application of the fair use doctrine in
copyright law can help address the rise of copyright trolls); and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette,
Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2294774 (discussing the need for greater poli-
cy diversity in patent law in order to better assess what actually promotes innovation).
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